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A brief look at the major trends in the history of the national cinema of Peru suggests 
that the relationship between the development of the moving image and the onset of 
modernity in that country has always been awkward. Many have argued that the 
advent of cinema coincided in most parts of the world with the decades when 
modernity was already ‘at full throttle . . . a watershed moment in which a series of 
sweeping changes in technology and culture created distinctive new modes of 
thinking about and experiencing time and space’.1 However, the reality for the 
majority of Latin American countries was quite different. As Ana M. López points 
out, it simply is not possible to link the rise of cinema in that part of the world to 
‘previous large-scale transformations of daily experience resulting from urbanization, 
industrialization, rationality and the technological transformation of modern life’.2 
Such developments were only just starting to emerge, so that as cinema was launched 
across the world, modernity in Latin America ‘was above all a fantasy and a profound 
desire.’3
Nevertheless, the arrival of cinema in Peru was, it appears, warmly welcomed 
by the elite of Lima, who greeted it as the very incarnation of the modernity to which 
they aspired. President of the Republic, Nicolas de Piérola was influenced in the 
reconstruction of his capital city by images of Paris brought by the world’s first 
filmmakers, that iconic city of modern sophistication with its grand spacious 
boulevards and fashionable inhabitants. Peruvian film production was late in getting 
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started compared to the rest of the world, and during Piérola’s regime (1895-1899) the 
newsreel and documentary forms were encouraged as modes of expression ideally 
suited to flaunting the efforts made by the Aristocratic Republic to modernize and 
expand its capital using funds raised from the export of its sugar, cotton, rubber, wool 
and silver. Furthermore, many of the early moving images made in Peru coincided 
with the first aviation flights in the country, with images of Lima taken from the air 
filling its inhabitants with pride at such an overt display of progress.4
During the second decade of the twentieth century, many more films were 
made to illustrate national ceremonies, funerals, and civic or religious occasions. 
Lima was the focus of these cinematic documents, with little attention being paid to 
the country’s multi-ethnic heritage. Unlike in many other countries where movie-
going was most popular with the working classes, the first Peruvian cinemas were 
installed in the more affluent parts of the capital, where dramas and comedies from 
France could be enjoyed by the social elite. 
Between 1919 and 1930, the eleven year period known as the Nueva Patria 
(literally, the New Fatherland), the country was ruled by the omnipotent President 
Augusto B. Leguía. Leguía and his government wanted to see Lima further 
transformed into a beautiful spacious city, the utmost expression of modernity, 
completing the project begun by Piérola. They thus ignored the realities of hardship 
and fragmentation throughout the rest of the country, and the tension between 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism that would mark Peruvian culture during the 
1920s.5 Documentaries were made, sponsored by the State, to record the grand 
carnivalesque celebrations held in Lima to commemorate the centenaries of Peruvian 
Independence in 1921 and the end of the battles of Junin and Ayacucho in 1924, and 
according to national film critic and historian Ricardo Bedoya: 
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 Alongside films that praised and congratulated the President were those that 
talked about the growing status and wealth of the country, of the prosperity 
which would last for many years, the product of collaboration with 
investment and technology from overseas, particularly the US. Cinema 
found itself tied to the official ideology and history of the State, promoting 
the message of a greater and more modern Peru.6
 
This chimes with a suggestion made by social theorist Jorge Larrain that the ‘power of 
an entertaining spectacle transmitted through images is very useful to create and 
maintain traditions that boost national feelings’.7 But despite this encouraging flurry 
of activity for documentary-makers, the fact remains that as the rest of the world 
adjusted to the introduction of sound to the moving image medium, Peruvian 
filmmakers were only just grappling with their first silent features, highlighting the 
real lack of technological resources, investment and experienced filmmakers in a 
country still struggling with the pressures of US-led industrialization. Leguía’s 
approach to modernization was simply to block any radical change that would benefit 
the working classes, and to open the country to further investment by US companies.8 
Ironically, however, Peru’s first fiction films were in fact quietly critical of the impact 
of Western-led progress, and promoted instead the traditional, rural life experienced 
by the majority of the population, thus presenting a challenge to the very idea of a 
coherent national State that was at the heart of modernity. One example was Camino 
de la venganza (Path to Revenge, Luis Ugarte, 1922), a medium-length drama that 
recounts the story of an innocent servant girl from a mining town who is kidnapped 
and brought to Lima by a military captain, to be corrupted by the many distractions in 
 3
the city. Conflict is established between a morally idyllic rural life where work in the 
fields alternates with collective gatherings for eating and dancing, and the dangers of 
Lima, a city replete with threat and temptation. This focus on the tension between 
urban and rural life was to become a recurrent theme of Peruvian cinema thereafter. 
The early 1930s saw film activity virtually grind to a halt as the Peruvian 
economy, so dependent on the export of its raw materials to the wealthy Northern 
countries, was devastated by the effects of the Wall Street Crash. Attempts were made 
to sustain production by a handful of key individuals but these projects were doomed 
to fail in such unstable circumstances. Later, that decade saw the establishment of a 
film production company that holds an important place in the history of Peruvian 
cinema: Amauta Films, named after the journal founded by leading Peruvian Marxist 
intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui, who had died in 1930, having also set up the first 
Socialist Party in Peru. As the government of the time became ever more repressive 
and intent on aggressive modernization of the country, Amauta Films made feature-
length movies that offered a romantic view of traditional life in the barrios of Lima. 
These were popular in some areas, but competition from the US, Italy and Mexico in 
particular - countries whose film industries were actively supported by their 
governments - eventually contributed to the downfall of the company by the end of 
the 1930s. 
Peruvian films made over the next few decades tended to reproduce the 
conventions of European or US movies and were lacking in any distinctive local color 
or national sentiment; indigenous communities were almost completely absent from 
the screen. Films were amateurish and unsophisticated, production was sporadic, and 
investment went into the distribution and exhibition of foreign films. Many 
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filmmakers left Peru, their films were lost and no infrastructure was left for their 
successors, who had to start from scratch.  
It is difficult to disagree therefore with Bedoya’s view that ‘[T]he history of 
cinema in Peru has always been one of crisis. The instability of crisis has been the 
normal condition at all stages of its intermittent existence’.9 Certainly, no legacy has 
been left by Peru’s early filmmakers, and the infrastructure and political support for a 
national film industry are as absent today as they were at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. However, there is one important period that appears to be at odds 
with this general assessment of events. In the early 1970s, the populist military regime 
led by General Velasco took a long-term interest in the possibilities of cinema 
production to support its own modernization projects. Whereas in the past such 
support had been singularly self-serving and short-lived, legislation passed in 1972 
provided sufficient flexibility and longevity for a range of filmmakers with varying 
ideological approaches to benefit from the scheme and to develop a degree of 
continuity verging on the creation of a national film industry. 
And yet just twenty years later this protective legislation had floundered and 
been abolished, and by the end of 1994, President Fujimori had introduced a more 
market-oriented cinema law. Since then Peru’s film industry has continued its steep 
decline. Despite much fanfare and excitement at the announcement of fresh legislation 
and economic support, delays in administration resulted in four ‘empty’ years for 
domestic film production.10 In the end, the majority of the resources promised by the 
State for this law to be upheld were allocated elsewhere, with the result that between 
1997 and 2001 just ten Peruvian feature films had been produced.11 Thus, the nation’s 
own film funding scheme had no money to award, and Fujimori’s government 
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collapsed suddenly amidst dramatic discoveries of widespread institutional and 
individual corruption. 
The remainder of this chapter aims to investigate these two most recent attempts 
by the Peruvian State to address its national cinema crisis, and the circumstances 
leading to the failure of those interventions. It further considers the ways in which 
Peru’s filmmakers have variously reacted and responded to the changes imposed upon 
them, in a society steeped in many different social and economic crises. I suggest that 
these latest developments in fact echo the frustrating and frustrated ‘stop-start’ 
tendencies of the history of cinema in Peru outlined above, and are inextricably linked 
to the approaches of successive regimes to the modernization of the country.12
 
The cinema law of 1972  
In 1972 a protectionist cinema law was introduced by the military government of 
General Juan Velasco, after five years of consultation with Peru’s filmmaking 
community. Velasco promoted himself nationally as a defender of the poor, 
redistributing land, and re-nationalizing private oil and mining companies. The 
motivation for the positive support given to the development of national cinema could 
therefore be interpreted as complementary to an overarching socialist reform program. 
Velasco was keen to fill national cinema screens with Peruvian images to replace the 
foreign ones that had dominated screens since the advent of cinema in Peru. The 
motivation for reclaiming Peruvian cinema screens for national directors and images 
of their country was in line with moves by the State to reclaim the oil fields of Talara 
from the International Petroleum Company and telecommunication systems from the 
All America Cables and Radio and ITT.13 Christian F. Wiener has further argued that 
the establishment of this type of cinema law was part of a very ambitious project to 
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intervene in the arena of mass communications, to stimulate national media 
production, and to convert it into an educational tool, a means of consolidating 
national culture and promoting the benefits of modernity.14  
This 1972 ‘Legislation for the Promotion of the Film Industry’ included the 
following five key features: 
 
1. Exhibitors were obliged to show a short Peruvian film before every imported 
feature presentation, and eight per cent of the total box office for that event would 
be paid to the makers of the short. The result was that some 1200 shorts were 
made during a twenty year period, providing a stable training ground for 
filmmakers, the potential for technological and personnel infrastructure to be 
established, and the development of financial resources to be invested into feature 
filmmaking. 
2. Up to five Peruvian-made features would be selected each year for screening in 
the top cinemas of Lima. Investors, more certain of financial reward, would as a 
result commit to developing strategic marketing and promotions campaigns. The 
outcome in 1985, for example, was that a small national film called Gregorio 
(Gregory, made by the Chaski Group) enjoyed the same box-office success in 
Peru as several US blockbusters released that decade. Although the number of 
feature films produced each year during this period did not rise significantly, there 
was a constant flow of work for cinema crew and cast.15 
3. A ‘holdover’ strategy was established whereby Peruvian features would remain on 
release until the weekly box-office figures dipped below a specified level. This 
allowed for word of mouth to build, and restricted exhibitors from replacing a 
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reasonably successful Peruvian film with a guaranteed money-spinning 
Hollywood blockbuster.  
4. Subsidies would be available to filmmakers and investors in the form of welcome 
tax exemptions. 
5. In addition, ticket prices were kept artificially low, controlled in much the same 
way as were prices for sugar and bread, to keep cinema-going accessible to as 
wide a range of the population as possible, thus safeguarding its status as media 
for the ‘masses’. This factor contributed further to the success of films such as 
Gregorio, which was made with an audience from the more deprived parts of the 
country and the capital in mind.16 
 
Protectionist legislation such as this was common to many so-called ‘infant’ film 
industries in Latin America; its general aim, according to observers such as Jorge 
Schnitman, was to encourage an industry threatened by foreign competition, enabling 
it to achieve economies of scale before moving to more independent models of 
operation.17 The specific and overt aim of this legislation was to further the 
government’s modernization program, which followed Ernest Gellner’s argument that 
modernization entails, among other things, acquisition and mastery of technology.18 
Indeed Bedoya is clear that the practice of film production in Peru was used as an 
affirmation of modernity, and the Cinema Law was put in place primarily to ensure 
that national filmmakers would promote the State’s ideology of revolution.19  
Despite the advantages outlined above, some issues of concern to Peruvian 
filmmakers remained neglected by the legislation. The market for films was still 
limited to the domestic one as difficulties in finding distribution channels abroad were 
not fully addressed. There were insufficient funding sources, and it was increasingly 
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hard for new, inexperienced filmmakers to gain access to credit. There was, 
furthermore, no guarantee that the decision to approve a film for obligatory screening 
would not be influenced by an increasingly intolerant political regime that was wary 
of any form of criticism.20  
Nevertheless, national film production in Peru was undoubtedly stimulated 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The making of short films became a lucrative activity 
with exhibition guaranteed and investments quickly returned, especially with an 
exchange rate kept artificially favorable so as to assist the purchase of equipment and 
stock from the US. New filmmakers thus gained more opportunities for artistic and 
technical experimentation and training. In particular, this era saw the rise of Peru’s 
only internationally renowned director of recent times, Francisco Lombardi. 
Meanwhile, one sector grew increasingly alienated. The owners of cinema 
theaters considered the law to be an unwanted imposition of films that they would not 
have screened given the choice. An authoritarian government was breathing life into 
cinema production at the expense of box-office income, leading to an unhelpful 
fragmentation of the national cinema project. Exhibitors even complained of having to 
bear increased electricity costs caused by longer screening sessions. Moreover, there 
was soon an unrealistic glut of shorts to be screened and it must have come as little 
surprise that the demise of the 1972 Cinema Law was welcomed, and to some extent 
encouraged by national cinema exhibitors. 
The public also reacted negatively to the poor technical quality of many of the 
films of this period, especially the shorts. With the pressure mounting to produce as 
many films as possible, the criteria of success being quantity over quality, many 
production companies neglected to make improvements to sound and color, to their 
ultimate cost. This was partly due to a lack of proper equipment, but also caused by 
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the proliferation of companies established primarily to benefit financially in the short 
term from the opportunities that the Cinema Law promised. Indeed, few of them 
reinvested profit in the development of a national cinema infrastructure. Furthermore, 
technical blunders were largely overlooked as increasingly films were rejected from 
the guaranteed screening and tax credit system purely for offering a critical vision of 
the military regime and social order, regardless of whether they were well-made. 
 
The decline of the Cinema Law and its abolition in 1992   
By the end of the 1980s, the Cinema Law had all but run its course, and its original 
deficiencies were clear. In addition, the reality of an acute economic crisis within the 
country and the break-up of the model of development promoted by Velasco’s 
government were reflected in the growing difficulties posed by making films in Peru. 
The lack of secure funds put the brake on developments and frustrated expectations. 
Investment in film production became, once again, a high-risk activity as cinemas 
began to contravene the Law by refusing to show national product. The internal 
market weakened, and the export of films became almost impossible. Little money 
was left from the preceding period, and the Banco Industrial, the main bank involved 
in supporting film activity, now actively excluded from credit arrangements all new 
filmmakers, along with any more experienced directors who had no guaranteed back-
up resources. Hyperinflation meant that any funds acquired were in any case spent 
within a few days of starting shooting, and projects were either abandoned or took 
several years to reach the screens. 
Many out-of-town cinemas, where the appeal of locally made movies had been 
greatest, went out of business during the 1980s and early 1990s for several reasons. 
Terrorism led to the imposition of curfews, regular power cuts broke into almost 
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every screening, and ticket prices eventually had to rise out of the reach of most 
people due to the devastating effects of hyperinflation, despite government efforts to 
keep them low.  
So it was within this context that new President Alberto Fujimori announced 
in 1992 that he intended to make important changes to the framework for national 
cinema.21 With some anxiety, the Filmmakers Association of Peru reluctantly began 
to work with the government on re-presenting a policy that they had started to develop 
during the late 1980s, one which would support the development of national cinema, 
but within the new economic framework, and involving representatives from 
distribution and exhibition sectors. The 1972 Cinema Law was officially abolished in 
December 1992, and the Association worked with Congress for two years on a new 
plan.  
US distributors saw an opportunity meanwhile to develop a more middle-class 
audience which would now identify more readily with the affluent lifestyles offered 
by Hollywood product than with the more somber Peruvian reality portrayed by the 
majority of the country’s own filmmakers. These distributors became involved in the 
debate, and via their Ambassador put pressure on a government showing signs of 
interest in foreign investment from the US.  
In the event, a new Cinema Law was passed in October 1994, by which time plans 
for US-financed and -programmed multiplex cinemas in affluent areas of Lima were 
in place, audience demographics had inevitably shifted almost entirely to the middle-
classes, and national filmmaking had all but ground to a halt. 
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The 1994 Cinema Law and its impact  
The key difference with regard to the new law was its objective that cinema should no 
longer be regarded principally as an industrial activity and overt signifier of the 
country’s progress towards modernization, but as an important cultural activity for 
producers and viewers. In the text accompanying the law, President Fujimori signaled 
for the first time since elected what he considered ought to be the cultural policy of 
the State at a time of liberal democracy, declaring that: ‘one of the responsibilities of 
the State [was] to develop, disseminate and preserve national culture, for the purpose 
of affirming the country’s cultural identity, without seeking financial recompense’.22
Filmmaker and lawyer José Perla Anaya, in his final speech to fellow national 
filmmakers after four years as president of the body set up to administer and apply the 
new law, gives the following summary of its development and nature: 
 
In October 1994, the new Peruvian Cinema Law 26370 was established, and 
was finally approved in May 1995. CONACINE was set up on 5 January 
1996. Three representatives were designated from the Ministry of Education, 
Indecopi (the national body for the protection of intellectual property) and 
INC (the National Institute of Culture), and seven members elected by 
cinema associations […] Thus Law 26370 came into effect, with a model of 
incentives for production based on competitions and prizes. There was no 
longer to be any tax exemption nor obligatory exhibition for Peruvian films. 
The law’s other ambitious responsibilities included the dissemination of 
national cinema, cinema education, the organization of film archives, and 
the establishment and maintenance of a cinema register.23  
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This competition-based funding model was based very loosely on similar experiments 
in Europe and elsewhere in Latin America. A new national film organization, 
CONACINE (Consejo Nacional de Cinematografía – National Film Council), was set 
up within the Ministry of Education to assess, administer and award the $1.5 million 
per year promised by Fujimori. In theory there were to be six prizes per year for 
features and forty-eight for shorts. In practice, however, no more than half a dozen 
feature films and around thirty shorts have been awarded funding since 1994, partly 
because of the government’s failure consistently to make available the promised 
resources. This was due in part to the fact that the Ministry of Education’s limited 
resources have been more urgently required for basic education costs, and also 
because the necessary matched-funding has been almost impossible to locate, 
especially for short films. Moreover, when compared to the annual sum of $40 million 
promised to Argentine filmmakers in 1995, the $1.5 million that Fujimori set aside a 
year earlier seems woefully inadequate.24
The President’s announcements in 1994 aroused suspicion amongst filmmakers, 
who specifically attacked the abandonment of the obligatory screening aspect of the 
previous legislation. They also feared that the competitions would become a form of 
indirect censorship by the State, and there was general concern about how long the 
financial commitment would last. Although they admitted that there had been a need 
to revise the old law, and indeed a great deal of effort had been put into doing just 
that, the filmmakers themselves were reticent about placing their faith in a regime still 
lacking an overarching cultural policy, and with more pressing economic priorities. 
The following extract from a speech given by Nilo Pereira del Mar, filmmaker and 
President of the Filmmakers Association of Peru, at the first prize-giving ceremony 
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for shorts and feature film projects in December 1996, gives some indication of the 
anger that was still felt by many: 
 
As everyone knows, these last four years have been devastating for national 
cinema. The production of national films, which had been fairly constant 
since 1972, was abruptly interrupted by the abolition of the main financial 
incentives for the production of shorts and features. It is important to point 
out that when this regrettable break occurred, national cinema had reached a 
maturity of content and professional quality which opened up an 
international space thanks to prizes and screenings all over the world. 
Twenty years of unbelievable effort by more than 200 filmmakers over two 
generations were about to be sent into oblivion. Nevertheless, we persevered 
with our dreams. And for four years we battled tirelessly to achieve a new 
legal framework that would allow us to really get on with our work.25  
 
Despite Perla Anaya’s positive and determined attitude to make this Law work, it 
seemed doomed from the start. At the very first prize-giving ceremony, criticism was 
raised on the part of filmmakers as to why only seven out of the twelve available 
prizes had been awarded, especially as some of those who were not recipients had 
already been given prizes at national and international festivals for those very films 
now undergoing assessment domestically. Pereira del Mar questions the criteria on 
which the CONACINE awards were allocated a little later in the same speech: 
 
We sincerely hope that judgement of each film project was not based on its 
ideological approach, when the decision should have been based on artistic 
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criteria. We only say this because several of the Jury members have made a 
point of supporting freedom of expression and battling against film 
censorship, and it surprises us that they have rejected precisely those works 
whose vision is not the most sympathetic towards our reality.26  
 
His criticisms continue: 
 
In the case of the competition for features, we are delighted that the three 
prizes have been awarded, as indicated by the Law. However, we would 
have liked one of those to have been a proposal from a new director, so as to 
fit in with the Law’s objectives and ethics of promotion.27  
 
Thus it appears that at least one important group of filmmakers had concerns about 
the interpretation and application of the new Law. Pereira admits that they were aware 
that it was no longer appropriate simply to replicate the phenomenon of Law 19327, 
when practically every work benefited. They also believed that they needed to be 
shown evidence of coherence and understanding of a cinematic reality which had 
been paralyzed for four long and difficult years. Their most immediate concern was 
that the decision not to award more than forty per cent of the prizes would make the 
production of shorts even more challenging in the coming year.  
The year 1997 was, however, more promising, with two further competitions 
for shorts (still only half that promised by the Law), in which all twenty-four available 
prizes were awarded, and one further competition for features, in which three more 
projects received support. However, by 1998 funds had become extremely scarce and, 
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by Perla Anaya’s own admission, amounts owed to prize-winning companies for 
feature productions were mounting up.28
One film project that suffered tremendous setbacks partly as a result of 
uncertainty caused by the ‘new’ Cinema Law was El bien esquivo (The Elusive 
Good). Augusto Tamayo’s project was awarded the top prize of $188,000 (648,000 
nuevos soles) in 1997, but was not released until July 2001, four years later, having 
received just $14,500 (50,000 nuevos soles).29 The delay in itself is not wholly 
exceptional, but the unfortunate dispute in which the film’s writer and director was for 
a long time engaged with CONACINE and the Ministry of Education betrayed some 
of the inherent weaknesses of the legislative system. The film took longer to make 
than was allowed by the contract agreed with CONACINE, primarily due to problems 
with the identification of matched-funding. As a result, the $14,500 received may 
have to be returned. And yet the film was welcomed on its release as an important 
cultural product, according to positive reviews at the time, and achieved moderate 
success at the box office. 
Outspoken veteran filmmaker Armando Robles Godoy is rather more emphatic 
in his criticism of the system. In an article in La República, 22 November 1998, on 
the State-supported film Coraje (Courage), completed by Alberto Durant that year, he 
offered a cry of protest at the State’s indifference towards Peru’s national cinema: 
 
This [Coraje] is one of very few national films that have been made in 
recent years. There is almost no cinema in Peru because the government 
won’t get on with fulfilling the very same laws that it set up. At this rate, the 
century and the millenium will close with the complete abolition of Peruvian 
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cinema, a death throe that began in 1992, with the action of the Ministry of 
Finance and its sterile dogma of market-oriented policy.30  
 
In the same article, producer Andres Malatesta continues in a similar vein: 
 
A country without its own cinema is like a country without a face. We’ve 
demonstrated that we’re ready to compete, but for a long time we’ve had to 
confront so many financial headaches. CONACINE doesn’t have any 
money, it seems like cultural activity isn’t taken seriously, it’s terrible. We 
want clear quotas and obligatory exhibition, as we had with the 1972 
Cinema Law that was abolished in 1992. It’s incredible that in our own 
country we have to beg to get our films screened in our own cinemas.31
 
More recently, producer Stefan Kasper, one of the founding members of the socialist 
film-making Chaski Group, responded to an email interview on the importance of 
national cinema in the following way: 
 
Yes, national cinema is very important, and the State should definitely 
support it. Why? There is a range of ways in which cinema can contribute to 
the development of a country. It acts as the mirror and reflection of reality. 
People see themselves in their own films and need this image of themselves 
to help them construct their own identity. Cinema is also the image that one 
country projects to other countries, its way of communicating. Cinema is art 
and industry, and each country should develop it according to its own 
criteria, priorities and interests.32  
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 The films of the 1990s 
What kinds of films were eventually produced once the new Cinema Law was in 
place? To what extent is it possible to identify a distinctive style and set of thematic 
concerns common to Peruvian films of the 1990s? Peruvian cinema has never been 
greatly influenced by the major trends which made their mark elsewhere in Latin 
America; indeed the overtly left-wing political agenda of the 1960s’ and 1970s’ 
pioneers of the ‘new’ and revolutionary cinemas of the continent have had little 
impact on the Peruvian scene. Commentators argue that this is not because Peruvian 
filmmakers themselves have no political inclination, but rather because they have 
been drawn into a more quietly critical or allegorical discourse due to the need to have 
films approved by a government body in order to qualify either for obligatory 
screening or for a competitive award.33 The few exceptions to this trend, such as 
Marianne Eyde’s La vida es una sola (You Only Live Once, 1993) which dared to 
show less sympathy for the military than for the rural communities caught up in 
violence with the Shining Path rebels, suffered from a delayed release, difficulties 
with funding, and negative reception from certain areas of the press. 
Furthermore, the lack of economic support has meant that filmmakers have 
had to rely almost exclusively on box-office returns, and a desire to please rather than 
challenge the audience has become fundamental to ensuring continuity. Hence, a 
rather unremarkable approach to filmmaking has emerged, with either a focus on 
realist re-constructions of actual events already in the public sphere, or a ransacking 
of myths from the past, mixing anthropology with fetishistic mysticism and an 
increasingly touristic gaze. Indeed many Peruvian film critics have lamented the lack 
of innovation and dynamism shown by many of the nation’s filmmakers.34  
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The most consistent director, and the only one to have gained sustained 
international recognition, is Francisco Lombardi, whose works have been appreciated 
for their classic dramatic structure and realist themes concerning personal and 
political violence. He benefited from the opportunities offered by the 1972 Cinema 
Law and gained early success at festivals with controversial feature films exploring 
the military and the terrorist movements, such as La ciudad y los perros (The City and 
the Dogs, 1985) and La boca del lobo (In the Mouth of the Wolf/The Lion’s Den, 
1988). During the 1990s, Lombardi made six features, none of which relied on 
government-sponsored prizes or subsidies, but which succeeded in attracting 
investment from overseas.35  
 
Co-productions and foreign relations 
With very limited national investment, and the narrowing of the internal market, the 
only way forward in terms of funding in recent years has tended to be via 
international co-production arrangements. Even during the 1980s, out of thirty-seven 
national films, seventeen were part-financed by overseas capital, mainly from 
Europe.36 Throughout the 1990s, Lombardi’s projects built on the success of the 
previous decade and attracted a good level of co-production support from Europe and 
other parts of Latin America, leading perhaps inevitably to a certain 
internationalization of subject matter, but enabling him to remain independent of the 
vagaries of the State system. Yet even he has seen the funds dry up as investors’ 
attentions have been diverted to filmmakers who are backed by some sort of national 
infrastructure. More recently, Lombardi saw his own production infrastructure 
collapse when his main Peruvian producer was last year found to be implicated in the 
Fujimori corruption scandals.37
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In his last speech as president of CONACINE, Perla Anaya summarized all 
the most recent steps that had been taken by this organization in collaboration with 
filmmakers’ associations in an attempt to stimulate film production once more. 
Several of these measures acknowledge the need to participate in the global market 
and to develop partnerships with other countries. For example, a proposal was put to 
PromPeru, a government body set up to promote the country as a destination of 
choice for tourism and business, to set up a travelling exhibition of national cinema 
and to finance trips by the makers of feature films in search of resources. Some 
interest was expressed at first, but the progress made has been limited. In 1997, the 
Filmmakers Association of Peru, with the support of CONACINE, drew up a plan to 
create a national film fund, with resources to be drawn from the exchange of external 
debt for investment in film production. This proposal, named FINPROCI, has not yet 
been formally approved by the government despite repeated campaigns to highlight 
the need for such a project. Other projects include a Peruvian Film Commission, 
promoting the use of Peru as a film location for overseas companies, and the 
Ibermedia program, a multilateral fund for film production that promotes the 
development of film projects by Latin American companies through awarding grants. 
However, despite government promises since 1997 to pay the annual quotas required 
for Peru to become a member of such a program, no resources have yet been 
forthcoming.38
The government of the late 1990s appears to have favored more direct and 
increasingly accessible means of communication technology such as television and 
the Internet, and the potential for national cinema to contribute to this renewed 
modernization project via mass communication seems remote. Moreover, although 
observers such as Ian Jarvie may argue that movies might still be considered as at 
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least a way-station to acquiring and mastering the more politically useful 
communication technologies of television and computers, the Fujimori government 
demonstrated no interest in protecting its film industry even for that reason.39
 
Concluding remarks 
Despite two rounds of legislation aimed ostensibly at stimulating national cinema, the 
Peruvian film industry at the turn of the twenty-first century was again in crisis. The 
first intervention in 1972, with its overt links to a State modernization project, 
enjoyed a measure of success but required evaluation, revision and development both 
to stay in line with changing political and economic contexts, and to benefit 
distribution and exhibition activities as well as film production. Instead it was 
abolished and replaced with a funding competition which was received with some 
skepticism, and which in the event completely failed, mainly due to a lack of genuine 
interest and economic support from the Fujimori regime. In addition, potential 
international co-producers turned their back on Peru’s filmmakers, government 
corruption dragged the whole country into further turmoil, and the new Toledo-led 
regime installed in 2001 has yet to turn its attentions seriously to developing a 
coherent cultural policy as it grapples with the more pressing social dilemmas of acute 
poverty and unrest. As a consequence, a new generation of potential film talent is 
being driven to seek opportunities abroad, or within the more lucrative markets of 
television and multi-media.40
Meanwhile, the filmmaking community in Peru remains somewhat divided: 
while some (such as Robles Godoy and Kasper, cited above) have campaigned for a 
system based on the one developed during the protectionist years of quota, subsidy 
and guaranteed screening, others (such as Lombardi, Salvini, Velarde) seem to have 
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embraced, however reluctantly, the need to find ways of working within a global 
market dominated by the US.41 What they appear to share, with each other and with a 
century of Peruvian film ‘pioneers’, is the somewhat utopian vision of a stable and 
independent infrastructure for Peruvian national cinema, as expressed by one of the 
main spokespeople for the decade, Perla Anaya: 
 
I continue to believe that these legal and economic problems can be 
overcome if we really work at it. All I ask is that those who really love our 
national cinema never tire of working in it and for it, however deficient or 
limited our actions might seem to be.42  
 
In summary, Peru’s filmmakers moved from having a clear, if somewhat functional 
role within the inward-looking nationalist modernization agenda of General Velasco, 
to the promise of a broader cultural one under President Fujimori. The latter’s neo-
liberal approach, leaving national filmmakers to compete against international 
industries under economic conditions that favor product from outside the country, 
appears in some ways to have more in common with those of earlier regimes led by 
Piérola and Leguía, who were seduced by the films, lifestyles and investment 
opportunities of Europe and the US. In the end, the promise of an overarching cultural 
policy remained unfulfilled, and just a few years after Fujimori’s dramatic 
disappearance from the political scene it still appears to be too early to weigh up the 
possibility of renewed support from a regime whose leader has promised to prioritize 
the basic needs of the rural and poor majority.43 In the meantime, Peru’s filmmakers 
continue the search for finance and a role in an increasingly crisis-ridden country that 
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in many respects is still finding the transition to modernity a painful one, imposed 
upon it from the outside like the Hollywood blockbusters that dominate its screens.  
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